In classical two-party computation, a trusted initializer who prepares certain initial correlations can help make the bipartite computation secure. We propose two bipartite quantum protocols with possible aborts for approximately generating such bipartite classical correlations with varying degrees of privacy, without introducing a third party. The two parties are assumed to be weakly cooperating and one of them needs to be modestly honest so that the quantum precomputed correlations can be established successfully. Then the main two-party classical computation has nontrivial information-theoretic security for generic circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of two-party computation is a main research topic in classical cryptography. The goal is usually to correctly compute some function of the inputs from the two parties, while keeping the inputs as private from the opposite party as possible. This has been studied using classical homomorphic encryption techniques [1, 2] or through implementing Yao's "Garbled Circuit" solution [3] . Another possibility is to introduce a trusted third party, who may sometimes interact with the two parties for multiple rounds. To lower the requirement on the trusted third party, a "trusted initializer" has been proposed [4] . Such trusted initializer only prepares some initial correlations between the two parties, and does not interact with any party afterwards. A trusted initializer who prepares certain initial correlations, referred to as "one-time tables", can help make the bipartite computation secure.
In this work, we propose two-party quantum protocols with aborts as replacements for the trusted initializer, for achieving some degree of information-theoretic security in bipartite classical computation. Our main protocols are based on Protocol 1 which implements the following task approximately with partial privacy: it takes as input two locally-generated random bits x and y from Alice and Bob, respectively, and outputs two bits (x AND y) XOR r and r on the two parties, where r is a random bit. We propose Protocol 2 to select some one-time tables generated by Protocol 1. It allows Bob to abort during the protocol when he finds that Alice is cheating. When Protocol 2 is used in the generic interactive bipartite classical computing task, the data leakage of Alice is asymptotically vanishing for perfect physical systems, but for noisy physical systems, the leakage is linearly related to the noise level. The data privacy of Bob is partial: the leakage is about half of his input bits, but the privacy is better in the case that the function allows many different inputs of Bob to give rise to the same result, including the case that the function effectively evaluates universal circuits. We then propose Protocol 3 which is based on Protocol 2, such that the data privacy of Alice is asymptotically vanishing and almost independent of the physical errors, while the data privacy of Bob is still good but worse than that in Protocol 2 under comparable resource cost. The security of the overall protocol is dependent on that the two parties are weakly cooperating and that Bob indeed does the checking in the preprocessing so that the one-time tables can be generated.
The structures of Protocols 2 and 3 are similar: both protocols have some initial steps for generating some correlations, and some step for verification, and postselection of some generated correlations. The difference is only that Protocol 3 has an extra post-processing step, and the usages of the protocols in the later bipartite classical computation task are different. The verifications in these protocols take hint from similar procedures for quantum key distribution [5] . Success is not guaranteed if Alice always cheats, but this does not cause much problem since Alice's cheating is caught with high probability, and this is a preprocessing stage anyway so the useful data is not leaked. The failures in the quantum gates, measurements, and entanglement generation or qubit transmissions in the preprocessing stage can be tolerated by trial-and-error. These failures are required to be reported in the protocols, so they have no effect for Bob's testing and later computations. In some experimental implementations the failures might not be reported and might appear as errors, and this would affect the security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II contains some introduction of the background. In Sec. III we introduce the quantum protocols. Sec. IV shows applications in general two-party classical computation, and the security assumptions. Sec. V contains some discussions. Sec. VI contains the conclusion and some open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
On computing two-party classical functions with quantum circuits, Lo [6] studied the data privacy for publicly known classical functions with the output on one party only. Buhrman et al [7] studied the security of two-party quantum computation for publicly known classical functions in the case that both parties know the outcome, although with some limitations in the security notions. These and other results in the literature [8] suggest that secure bipartite classical computing cannot be generally done by quantum protocols where the two parties have full quantum capabilities. In the current work, the protocols allow aborts in the quantum preprocessing (Bob may abort when he detects that Alice has cheated), so the scenario considered here does not fit into the assumptions in the works mentioned above. We have considered adopting a non-standard assumption that the parties in the main bipartite computation stage are restricted to be entirely classical; but such assumption does not appear to be essential.
Next, we introduce the simplest case in the one-time tables [4] . The bipartite AND gate with distributed output is a gate that takes as input two distant bits a and b, and outputs (a · b) ⊕ r and r on the two parties, respectively, where r is a uniformly random bit. (XOR is denoted as ⊕; AND is denoted as the · symbol.) It is sufficient for secure two-party classical computation, although there may be other constructions. Theoretically, the bipartite AND gate with distributed output on two distant input bits a and b can be computed while keeping both input bits completely private, with the help of a precomputed ideal one-time table of the nonlocal-AND type. Later we present approximate generation methods for such one-time tables. The one-time table has two locally-generated uniformly random bits x and y on the two parties, respectively, and also has (x · y) ⊕ r and r on the two parties, respectively, where r is a uniformly random bit. The steps for the bipartite AND-gate computation are as follows:
1. Alice announces a ′ = a ⊕ x. Bob announces b ′ = b ⊕ y. 2. Alice takes the output (x · y) ⊕ r from the one-time table, and computes the XOR with x · b ′ , and regard the result as her output of the bipartite AND-gate computation. Bob takes the output r from the one-time table, and computes the XOR with a ′ · b, and regard the result as his output of the bipartite AND-gate computation.
The XOR of the two output bits is (
while each output bit is a uniformly random bit when viewed alone, because r is a uniformly random bit. Since the messages a ′ and b ′ do not contain any information about a and b, the desired bipartite AND gate is implemented while a and b are still perfectly private.
III. THE QUANTUM PROTOCOLS
The two main quantum protocols to be introduced later are based on Protocol 1, which is the distributed-output version of a subprocedure of a protocol from [9] . The Protocol 1 effectively computes an AND function on two remote classical bits from the two parties, with the output being a distributed bit, i.e. the XOR of two bits on the two parties. The security is not ideal: the plain use of such protocol would give rise to non-ideal security in (interactive) quantum homomorphic encryption [9] , and the security is such that some additional verification need to be added in the protocol for it to be nontrivial. Here we propose a quantum protocol as a preprocessing stage for a bipartite classical computation task. By allowing verification and postselection, the security level in the quantum protocol becomes higher than that achievable from the plain use of Protocol 1. The postselected correlations (one-time tables) can be used in a classical bipartite computation task with high levels of correctness and of the privacy of input data.
In Protocol 1, denote |+ := (|0 − |1 ), and the random bits are unbiased and independent of other variables by default.
Protocol 1 A quantum protocol for generating the one-time table of the nonlocal-AND type with partial privacy Input: A random bit x from Alice and a random bit y from Bob. Output: (x · y) ⊕ r and r on the two sides, where r is a random bit.
The input and output together form the one-time table.
1. Alice generates a random bit s. If s = 0, she encodes x's value into |x |0 ; if s = 1 and x = 0, she prepares the state |+ |+ ; in the remaining case s = x = 1, she prepares the state |+ |− .
2. She teleports the pair of qubits to Bob without telling him the bit for Z correction on the first qubit nor the bit for X correction on the second qubit. When s = 0, she records the bit for X correction on the second qubit as t, otherwise she records the bit for Z correction on the first qubit as t. Then t is a random bit.
3. If y = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on the two received qubits (with the first qubit as the control qubit), otherwise he does nothing.
4. Bob teleports the resulting qubits to Alice, while withholding part of the information about the measurement outcomes: he calculates the XOR of the two measurement outcomes in the teleportation of each qubit, and calculate the XOR of the obtained two bits in each pair, and sends the resulting bit to Alice. Thus, Alice receives the two qubits with a possible σy mask for each qubit, together with possible simultaneous σz masks on both qubits. If a σy correction is needed for one received qubit, we regard Bob's mask bit for that qubit as 1, and otherwise we regard it as 0. Bob's output bit in the protocol is the XOR of the two mask bits.
5.
If s = 0, Alice measures the two received qubits in the Z basis, otherwise she measures them in the X basis. She calculates the XOR of both outcomes, and take the XOR with t, and obtains a bit. She flips this bit if s and Bob's sent bit are both 1. The obtained bit is her output.
In Protocol 1, Alice's input bit has partial privacy even for a cheating Bob, while Bob's input bit is secure for an honest Alice, but is not secure at all for a cheating Alice. The privacy of Alice's input bit x can be quantified using the accessible information or the trace distance. The accessible information, i.e. the maximum classical mutual information corresponding to Bob's possible knowledge about Alice's input, is exactly 1 2 bits, which happens to be equal to the Holevo bound in the current case. For a cheating Bob to get the maximum amount of information, his best measurement strategy in the current case is to use a fixed projective measurement: to measure the first qubit in the X basis, and the second qubit in the Z basis. The trace distance of the two density operators for Alice's two possible input values is 1 2 , by direct calculation (see also [9] ). Thus, the probability that Bob guesses Alice's input bit correctly is (1 + In the following we present two protocols which check or combine the one-time tables generated in Protocol 1. The first one has partial security for Alice and near-perfect security for Bob, while the second one aims for near-perfect security for both parties with higher resource cost.
In Protocol 2, Alice's input bit has partial privacy, which is the same as in the analysis of Protocol 1 above. When the ratio q m is near one, the nonlocal correlations in the remaining unchecked one-time tables can be regarded as almost surely correct. This is because of Bob's checking. We require Alice to be weakly cooperating, that is, she does not cheat in some of the batches of instances, since otherwise no one-time table may pass the test. In the following we assume that Bob is mildly honest, which means that he indeed does the checking; but we allow him to use a superposed input and later collapse it if the instance is chosen for checking; those instances not subject to checking may be then in a superposition state, but Alice could later do computational-basis measurements to collapse them, Protocol 2 A partly-secure quantum protocol for checking the one-time tables 1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 1 repeatedly (or run many instances in parallel) to generate some one-time tables, and exchange messages to agree on which instances were successfully implemented experimentally. Suppose m one-time tables were implemented. The one-time tables labeled by j has inputs aj and bj, and outputs ej and fj .
2. Bob randomly selects q integers in {1, · · · , m}, which are labels for which one-time table. He tells his choices to Alice. The integer q satisfies that m − q is an upper bound on the required one-time tables in the main bipartite computing task, and the ratio q m is related to the targeted security level of the overall computation.
3. Alice sends the bits aj and ej to Bob for all chosen labels j.
4. For any chosen label j, Bob checks if aj and ej satisfy that aj · bj = ej ⊕ fj . If the total number of failures is larger than some preset number of Bob's (e.g. 0, or a small constant times m), he aborts the protocol, or restarts the protocol if needed. Otherwise, the remaining one-time tables are regarded as having passed the checking and will be used later in the two-party classical computing task. They may repeat the steps above to prepare more one-time tables on demand.
without affecting the correctness of the protocol. For an honest Alice, the resulting correlation is correct. We now discuss the case that Alice cheats. If Alice cheats and gets at least partial information about Bob's input bit y (using the notations in Protocol 1, same below), the state sent from Alice to Bob must be different from what is specified in the protocol; her best choice of state for cheating is mentioned previously. To pass Bob's test, she should know both y and r, or know both y and y ⊕ r. 
where the two classical mutual information in each inequality are defined under the same measurement M of Alice.
Proof. The overall communication from Bob to Alice in Protocol 1 is only one classical bit (note the entangled states used in the teleportations are fixed and do not count towards the amount of communication), then, by the Holevo bound (also noting that there are effectively no other prior correlations between the two parties besides the fixed entangled state, so the locking of information [10] does not occur here), the amount of information that Alice learns about the joint distribution of y and r is upper bounded by 1 bit. The bits y and r are independent when Bob produces them, so the y and r are independent prior to Alice's measurement. Thus the inequality (1) holds. The bits y and y ⊕ r jointly determine y and r, so the amount of information that Alice learns about the joint distribution of y and y ⊕ r is upper bounded by 1 bit. And since the bits y and y ⊕ r are independent prior to Alice's measurement, we have that the inequality (2) holds.
⊓ ⊔
The inequalities (1) and (2) together imply
The probability that Alice passes Bob's test is related to the max(I M r , I
M y⊕r ) in Eq. (3). When the probability of passing approaches 1, such maximum approaches 1, then it must be that one of them approaches 1. Then, Prop. 1 implies that Alice can learn almost nothing about y. A rephrasing in terms of the rate of cheating is given below.
For proving the security of Protocol 2, we only need Eq. (3) in the region max(I M r , I
M y⊕r ) ≈ 1. Alice may cheat in some instances of Protocol 1 so we may define a rate of cheating. Partial cheating in a instance is converted into a fractional number of cheating instances in calculating such rate. When the rate of Alice's cheating is small, Bob would observe few wrong results. It is sort of subjective to determine the exact rate of cheating from the number of wrong results and the total number of tests in Protocol 2, since it depends on the a priori knowledge about the probability distribution for Alice's rate of cheating. Suppose that after some checking, Bob decides that Alice's rate of cheating is ǫ, which is a small positive constant near 0, then the following approximation holds for the uniform distribution of y and r: max(I Numerical calculations confirm the inequalities (1) through (3). The calculation assumes that Alice uses some general quantum pure state as input, allowing an ancillary system of 4 dimensions, the maximum required by the Schmidt decomposition. Our calculations use projective measurements; note the same M occurs twice in each inequality.
Since the calculations on mutual information often stuck on local maxima, we did a different numerical calculation, that is, a numerical calculation of the Holevo bounds. The latter type of calculations converge quickly due to not having to consider measurement bases, and they indicate upper bounds of the information quantities so they are more convincing for showing the security of our protocols. The numerical results imply the following inequalities for the sum of Holevo bounds. The H y is the Holevo quantity which is the upper bound for the information learnable by Alice about the bit y. The other quantities are defined similarly, but note that they are conditioned on the uniform distribution for y.
where c is a constant somewhat larger than 1.388 and is yet to be precisely determined. This implies that
When the ancilla is 4 dimensions, numerics suggest that near the ends of the tradeoff curve indicated by Eqs. 4 and 5, one quantity approaches 1 bit while the other quantity approaches 0, and this verifies the security of Protocol 2. The numerically observed value of c is somewhat higher than 1.388 bits. For Alice's input state that achieves the numerically found maximal value of the left-hand-side, it satisfies that the two terms on the left-hand-side of Eq. (6) are about equal, and the corresponding sum of the form Eq. (3) under projective measurements is numerically found to be not greater than 1 bit. Also, for initial states satisfying max(H r , H y⊕r ) ≈ 1, the corresponding sum of the form Eq. (3) under projective measurements is numerically found to be not greater than 1 bit. When there is no ancilla, numerics suggest that the left-hand-side of Eq. (6) is not greater than 1 bit. The following protocol builds on Protocol 2, and it improves the privacy of Alice's input in the later main computation task, while that of Bob's input is somewhat compromised.
Protocol 3 A quantum protocol for generating improved one-time tables with combinations
1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 2 to obtain some one-time tables after Bob's checking. Suppose the instance labeled by j has inputs aj and bj, and outputs ej and fj .
2. Bob determines which remaining one-time tables are to be combined into one new instance of one-time table, and tells Alice his decision. Each new instance corresponds to a set S of old instances which satisfy that Bob's input bits are equal (denoted as c0). A new instance is constructed from the given set of old instances as follows: a ′ := j∈S aj mod 2,
In Protocol 3, the privacy of Alice's bit x for the combined one-time table is quite good: The accessible information for Bob is exactly 1 2 k bits, where k is the size of S in protocol description. It is because the different one-time tables from the first step are independent. The Holevo bound happens to coincide with the accessible information in the current case.
For the privacy of Bob's input bit y in the combined one-time table, it is possible for a cheating Alice to do a joint measurement on k received states from Bob, to learn the information about y and r simultaneously as much as possible (or y and y ⊕ r). Bob can deal with this by testing more one-time tables. The resource usage (the amount of entanglement needed and the amount of communication) is estimated to be about O(tk) times that of Protocol 2, to achieve the similar level of privacy for Bob, where t is the total number of one-time tables required for the later main computation, and k is the size of S in Protocol 3. The t factor appears here because Alice may use techniques similar to Grover's algorithm to increase the amount of information she may learn about y.
IV. APPLICATIONS FOR TWO-PARTY CLASSICAL COMPUTATION
The following Protocol 4 is for evaluating a linear polynomial with distributed output using the quantum preprocessing protocols introduced above. The linear polynomial is of the form z = (c + j a j b j ) mod 2, where c is a constant bit known to Bob, and a j and b j are bits on Alice and Bob's side, respectively. The output is the XOR of two bits on different sides.
Protocol 4 A protocol for evaluating classical linear polynomials with distributed output using one-time tables 1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 2 or Protocol 3 to obtain some one-time tables.
2. For evaluating the linear polynomial z = (c + j ajbj ) mod 2, Alice and Bob perform the evaluation of the nonlocal AND gate for aj and bj using the procedure in Sec. II, with the output being distributed. They locally calculate the XOR of all bits from the outputs, and Bob additionally takes the XOR with c. Each party obtains a bit as the output.
If Protocol 2 is used in Protocol 4, the data privacy of one party is partial. The leakage is about half of his or her input bits. See also the comments after Protocol 5 below.
By choosing the linear polynomial of the type z = [11, 12] .
For a generic boolean circuit, the main computation after the preprocessing does not include any aborts, and only requires the number of communication rounds to be about equal to the circuit depth. The protocol is shown as Protocol 5.
Protocol 5 A protocol for evaluating classical boolean circuits using one-time tables 1. Alice and Bob decompose the two-party circuit to be evaluated into some local circuits with AND, XOR gates, and some linear polynomials with bipartite input, while adding possible ancillary bits with fixed initial values.
2. For each AND gate not in the initial stage, the inputs are distributed, i.e. each bit is the XOR of two remote bits. Alice and Bob decompose such gate into the XOR of the outputs of two local AND gates and two nonlocal AND gates, the latter being a special case of the linear polynomial.
3. They perform the gates in the resulting circuit in pre-arranged order. The linear polynomials are evaluated using Protocol 4 with distributed output. The outputs of the linear polynomials affect the coefficients in the later linear polynomials.
If Protocol 2 is used in Protocol 5 with the roles of Alice and Bob switched, the data privacy of Bob is partial. The leakage is about half of his input bits in each polynomial. But the privacy is better in the case that the function allows many different inputs of Bob to give rise to the same result. In the case that the function effectively evaluates a universal circuit with data given by Alice and the logical circuit given by Bob, his input has partial privacy which is acceptable due to possible recompilations of Bob's logical circuit. If Protocol 3 is used instead of Protocol 2, it is suggested that Alice be the first party, to save the required number of one-time tables. Then Alice's data in the main computation is asymptotically secure because of the property of Protocol 3.
We usually assume that Bob honestly does the testing in the Protocols 2 and 3. There could be superpositions in the input and the output of these quantum protocols, but in the later classical computation task, the parties may do computational-basis measurements to force the superposed states to collapse. Now we discuss the case out of the assumption, that is, Bob cheats in the quantum protocols. He may cheat by not aborting after finding that Alice is cheating. This way of cheating is not powerful by itself, but becomes complicated to analyze if he also uses the second way to cheat at the same time, and we leave it for future study. The second way for him to cheat is to use general quantum input (allowing superpositions and entanglement) for the instances of Protocol 1. In such case, Alice may do computational-basis measurements in the main bipartite computation stage to force the collapse of superpositions. But he case that Bob combines the two cheating methods above is more complicated to analyze, especially since Alice may also cheat. The third way for Bob to cheat is by using superposed states in the main computation but not the preprocessing. This has no effect since Alice may make a computational-basis measurement on the state received from Bob in the main computation.
There are some no-go theorems for quantum bit commitment [13, 14] . Because of the fact that our quantum preprocessing protocols allow aborts, and there are some requirements on the players in those protocols, it is still possible that bit commitment can be implemented with the help of the one-time tables generated by the quantum preprocessing protocols. In the following we propose a bit commitment protocol using the above idea, inspired by a computationally-secure construction based on quantum one-way permutations [15] . Here, instead of using the quantum one-way permutations, we use a special bipartite classical computation with distributed output, with the help of quantum preprocessing. Our scheme is cheat-sensitive and subject to some other assumptions similar to those for the generic Protocol 5.
Protocol 6 A protocol for cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment under some assumptions 1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 3 to obtain some one-time tables with the degree of security dependent on resource usage. They decide on a large integer m related to the intended security of the current bit commitment protocol.
2. Suppose Alice wants to commit a bit b. She asks Bob to together calculate m nonlocal AND gates, using the method in Sec. II, with her input bits being always b, but Bob's inputs vary for each instance and are determined by Bob. They obtain some distributed bits as the outcomes. This completes the commit phase.
3. (Reveal phase) Alice sends Bob her output in the instances of the nonlocal AND gates in the previous step. Bob takes the XOR for the corresponding pairs of bits to recover the result of the nonlocal AND gates. From these results, Bob finds out b, or decide that Alice has cheated by sending him some random bit string so he cannot recover b.
In the last step of Protocol 6, if Alice sends Bob some random bit string, the results obtained by Bob are generally not consistent with any input value of b. For large m, it is hard for Alice to guess the appropriate bit string to send to Bob to make him believe the input was 1 − b.
V. DISCUSSIONS
The qubit-based quantum protocols in this work can be generalized to work for qudits in principle. This is inspired by the classical case in [4] . This requires some changes in the classical usage of the generated correlations.
The methods in this work are extendable to multipartite classical computation in principle. The pairs of parties (possibly including some server) may prepare one-time tables using the quantum protocols in this work.
The one-time tables generated by the quantum protocols in this work could in principle be used in a quantum bipartite computation task, in particular quantum homomorphic encryption [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . As for the quantum homomorphic encryption problem, an interactive protocol is obtainable by using the current method to evaluate classical linear polynomials, and use this as a subprocedure in the framework in [9] ; further, if the teleportation method in [22] is adopted instead of the corresponding simplified version in [9] , the number of rounds needed in the main computation may be reduced to a constant. But there are two points on which the security of the quantum computation may be somewhat weaker than in the classical case. First, it is less natural in the quantum protocol to impose classicality of the output of the one-time table. Imposing classicality of course helps security, but we doubt it is really necessary given our assumptions about the players in the preprocessing stage. In practice, we may assume that the output of the one-time tables have decohered prior to the use in the main computation. Second, in the current framework for quantum bipartite computation such as in [9] , the Pauli masks for the original input qubits are used as the variables in all the linear polynomials involved, this means the data privacy is worse than in the case of classical bipartite computation, in which the intermediate variables replace the roles of the initial variables in many of the linear polynomials. But the use of the quantum preprocessing in this work would give rise to better data privacy in quantum homomorphic encryption than some of the schemes in [9] , because those schemes require correlated encoding of the different variables, while the techniques here do not require correlated encoding of the different variables.
The following are some considerations about implementations and physical errors. The Protocol 1 makes use of teleportation [29] , with certain classical messages withheld by the sending party. Such step in the protocol is equivalent to the direct sending of quantum states that have been subject to certain Pauli operators just before sending. Using teleportations allows entanglement to be prepared by a fixed entanglement generating device, allowing for failures in preparation. This may also help getting rid of the issue of multiple photons in direct communication, which harms the privacy in Protocol 1. As for detector inefficiencies and dark counts, the fact that the Protocol 1 can be redone after failure can help mitigate the effects of these issues.
When Protocol 2 with noise is used for the bipartite classical computation task, the data leakage is about the product of the circuit size (the number of the one-time tables) and a small constant determined by the errors in the physical setup. This is because the physical errors and Alice's cheating look about the same for Bob in the verifications in Protocol 2. For circuits with a high level of parallelism, the data leakage per input bit is about the product of circuit depth and the error constant described above. So the allowed circuit depth is a constant, which is inverse proportional to the error constant. If Protocol 3 is used instead, the physical errors are somewhat less related to data privacy. There have been studies of the effects of noise in classical cryptographic tasks, and noise is not always bad for security [30] . Note that adding some assumptions about quantum capabilities may improve the security in bit commitment [31] . Adding similar assumptions on top of our quantum preprocessing protocols may improve the security in the applications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed two quantum protocols for approximately generating a certain type of classical correlations (a special case of the one-time table [4] ) with varying degrees of privacy, to be used in bipartite secure classical computation tasks. We show the application to evaluating linear polynomials and generic boolean circuits. Open problems include: applications in cheat-sensitive quantum implementation of other cryptographic primitives, which may be weaker than the plain version of the primitives; a refined analysis of the protocols, taking into account the physical errors in quantum states and operations; fault-tolerance; application to special classes of classical circuits; design of experimental schemes, where the failures must be known when they happen.
